First: for the theologian councils are never an end, with which he can be content, but rather a beginning. They bring forth new tasks and consequently do not diminish, but increase theological responsibility. Therefore, although we may admire the progress made by the Second Vatican Council, we should not overlook its limitations and its contingent character. For example, did not the Church in this council speak too exclusively of herself, in a narcissistic way, looking into a mirror, rather than through an open window into the world, to find her true countenance? Moreover, since the Church has evidently not spoken of everything of which she could have and should have spoken, it would be false and dangerous if theologians would limit themselves during the next fifty years to a mere commentary on the various constitutions of this council. For this reason, my remarks on \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"The Church and the World\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" will concentrate not so much on what the council said as on what the council did not say.

The second preliminary remark relates directly to our topic and its scope. Since the extensive scope of this topic can easily lead to superficiality, I will limit my treatment in two ways. The first limitation results from the fact that I write as a professor of fundamental theology. This discipline serves the responsibility of hope according to 1 Pet. 3, 15: \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"Always be prepared to make a defense to anyone who calls you to account for the hope that is in you. . . .\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" Thus fundamental theology seeks to explicate the faith in a manner corresponding to the present historical modes of human understanding. It does this, not in order to submit itself to the ruling modes of thought, but in order to enter into a fruitful conflict with these modes of thought. I will therefore treat this topic of \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"The Church and the World\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" as a problem which belongs to the responsibility of the Christian faith as confronted with the present historical situation and its modes of thought. The usual conflict between the thought of the times and the thought of the Christian faith often forces the individual Christian to walk through the crucial tests of his faith alone and without the adequate help of theology for his present situation.

The second limitation of my treatment results from the horizon¹ in which I would like to explain and to develop concretely the relation of the Christian faith to the world. This horizon is the future. And it reveals the world as history, history as final history (Endgeschichte), faith as hope, and theology as eschatology. This horizon characterizes the attempt of theology to surpass and to go beyond the modern transcendental, personalistic, and existential theology without disregarding its valuable insights. This transcendental, personalistic and existential theology has correctly emphasized the tole of the human person in contrast to the mere objectivistic viewpoint of scholastic theology. It has brought the Christian faith into a proper relationship to human existence and subjectivity. However, this theology faces two dangers. On the one hand, this anthropological theology tends to limit the faith by concentrating on the actual moment of the believer\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s personal decision. The future is then all but lost. It becomes only another name for the intractable factors of the present decision. On the other hand, this anthropological theology tends to become private and individualistic. It fails to responsibility.

1. See K. Rahner, \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"Theology and Anthropology,\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" p. 23, n. 1. 82bring into sufficient prominence the social and political dimensions of the believer\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s faith and

After these preliminary remarks, we turn to our topic \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"The Church and the World.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" I would like to develop three theses:

1) First, a thesis on the modern understanding of the world, with its stress on the future and its operational orientation.

2) Secondly, a thesis on the scriptural source of our understanding of the world, —an understanding rooted in the promises of God. 3) Thirdly, a thesis on the resulting notion of faith as a creative and militant relationship to the world understood in the light of God\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s promises.

1. first Thesis. The modern man\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s understanding of the world is fundamentally oriented toward the future. His mentality therefore is not primarily contemplative but operative.

First of all, the modern era persistently strives after the New (das Novum). This era began with the \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"new\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" world and this new world stamped the slogan of its program on the dollar bill:

\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"novus ordo seclorum.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" This striving after the new is the predominate spirit of the social, political and technical revolutions of our time. The men of this era are attracted and fascinated only by the future, i.e., by that which has never been. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"This fascination with the future transforms the existing and subsisting reality into a changing and a challenging reality, so that the real of this reality emerges as its possibilities for the future.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"²

Since the modern man\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"passion is for the possible\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" (Kierkegaard), the direct force of tradition has declined. The old quickly turns into the obsolete. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"The good old days\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" have lost their appeal. The golden age lies not behind us, but before us:

2. Gerhard Ebeling, Wort und Glaube, Tubingen, 1962, p. 387.

it is not re-created in the memories of our dreams, but created in the desires of our imagination and heart. Man\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s relationship to the past becomes increasingly a mere esthetic, romantic and archaic interest, and by his archival curiosity for the past he acknowledges the past as something antiquated. In other words, the present mentality has a merely historical {historisch) relationship to the past, but it has an existential (geschichtlich) relationship to the future.

Secondly: in his striving toward the future the modern man no longer experiences the world as an imposed fate, or as a sovereign sacrosanct nature confining him, but rather as a quarry —as the raw material—with which he builds his own \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"new world.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" He not only alters the world and forms it into the stage props for his own historical drama, but he also dominates the world through technology, and thereby secularizes it.³

Thirdly: How should theology relate itself to this new worldsituation? Some theologians play the ostrich and wish for the situation to pass. Others have taken the situation seriously and used various forms of dialectical theology to relate Christianity and the world (especially students and friends of Karl Barth:

e.g. F. Gogarten and D. Bonhoeffer). Since the new understanding of the world has questioned and even thrown away many of the tried and faithful- thought-forms ,pf the Christian faith, these perceptive theologians emphasize the radical otherness of the faith—its radical difference from this world. And in this paradoxical understanding of the Christian faith by the modern theologies of secularization, dialectical theology celebrates a victory in the theology of secularization. For example, the use of the dialectical theology of Barth, Gogarten and Bonhoeffer gives evidence to its ambiguous character in Harvey Cox\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s important book, The Secular City. He attempts in the first part to empha-size the total transcendence and otherness of God and the Christian faith, and in the second part of his book to unite eschatology and social revolution. But, I ask, how

3. See J. B. Metz, \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"Zukunft des Glaubens in einer hominisierten Welt,\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" in Weltverstdndnis im Glauben, J. B. Mett (ed.), Mainz, 1965, pp. 45-62.

can the gospel of the totally-other God flow into a social-gospel: in other words, how does Cox unite the first and second part of his book?⁴ In order to demonstrate the insufficiency of this reaction of \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"dialectical theology\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" we will examine in a more precise manner what has actually occurred in the modern age\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s new understanding of the world. The \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"World-Beyond\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" (Jenseils) and the \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"Heaven above us\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" has not only become hidden, but seems, to have disappeared. (What is hidden can indeed be powerful and near!) Slowly but constantly the world has lost its glimmer of divinity: we have this world in our hands and projects. No longer is the world recognized as the numinous vestibule of heaven. No longer do we directly discover in and on the world the footsteps of God, the vestigia Dei, but rather we see only the footsteps of men, the vestigia hominis, and his actions of changing the world. We apparently encounter in and on the world only ourselves and our own possibilities. The shining glow of the \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"world above\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" and the \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"world beyond\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" has dimmed. It seems as if it can no longer enlighten the spirit of man and enkindle his enthusiasm. What moves the man of today is not the commitment for the \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"world above\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" but the commitment to build a new world (or, if you will, to build a \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"great society\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"). This engagement and commitment to the future does challenge and appeal to the man of today, who otherwise seems so disenchanted and so a-religious.

Fourthly: Both in the West and the East every impressive Weltanschauung and humanistic ideology of today is oriented toward the future. We need only to think about Marxism and its theory of the classless society, according to which man himself produces his own future and society: The desired perfection of a successful mankind does not lie \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"above us\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" but \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"before us.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" The total modern critique against religion, beginning with the marxist critique, can be reduced to this common denominator:

4. See Francis Fiorenza, \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"Sakularisation und die sakularisiene Stadt,\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" Stimmen der Zeit, May, 1966.

Christianity, as well as religion in general, is powerless in the face of this primacy which the future occupies in the modern mentality. Our present age is therefore conceived of by these critics as the time of the liquidation of the religious mentality, as the beginning of a post-religious era, in which every belief in a transcendent God is exposed as a mere speculative conception of the mind, to be cast off and replaced by an active and operative orientation toward the future.

Fifthly: What does the Christian faith say or do in the face of this situation? How does the Christian account for his hope? Can he understand the world in a way that does not flatly exclude his faith, that does not force his theology into an irrelevant and incomprehensible paradox? Can the Christian faith perhaps find itself anew in this situation and grow in the midst of making the world? I believe it can, but under one condition: only if the Christian theologian becomes alarmed about a loss of eschatology, and only if he becomes disturbed about the neglect and unawareness of the future in his theology. This neglect is so persistent that, for example, the so-called existential interpretation of the New Testament involves only the re-actualization and the re-presentation of the past in the present moment of religious decision. The present alone dominates. There is no real future! Exempli gratia: Bultmann! We must bring together that which has been so long disastrously separated: namely Transcendence (God) and the Future, because this orientation toward the future is demanded by the biblical faith and message itself. Only then can the faith enter into a fruitful conflict and discussion with our modern era\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s passion for the future. Only a theology which has re-possessed its orientation to the future can seriously ask: where does this primacy of the future come from, which primacy impregnates the modern mentality and the political, social, and technical revolutions of our times? What is the origin of this primacy of the future? What is its foundation?⁵

2. Second Thesis. The orientation of the modern era to the future, and the understanding of the world as history, which results from this orientation, is based upon the biblical belief in the promises of God. This biblical faith demands that theology be eschatology.

I can naturally give only a few explanatory comments to this thesis. My direct appeal to the statements of the Sacred Scriptures is not arbitrary, but is based upon the results of recent biblical research in Germany, which in its post-Bultmannian period is bringing back into focus the Old Testament, and, secondly, is using the Old Testament as means of understanding the New Testament.

First of all, recent exegetical researches indicate that the words of Revelation in the Old Testament are not primarily words of statement or of information, nor are they mainly words of appeal or of personal self-communication by God, but they are words of promise. Their statement is announcement, their announcement is proclamation of what is to come, and therefore the abrogation of what is. (Perhaps the German would more clearly express my thought: Die Aussage ist Ansage, die Verkundigung ist Ankundigung des Kommenden und dadurch Aufkundigung des Bestehenden). This dominant proclamation and word of promise initiates the future: it establishes the covenant as the solidarity of the Israelites who hope, and who thereby experience the world for the first time as a history which is oriented to the future. This Hebrew experience and thought stands in contrast to Greek thought, which understands the world not as a history

5. Johannes B. Metz, \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"Gott vor uns,\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" Ernst Block zu Ehren, Frankfurt, 1965, pp. 227-241.

oriented to the future, but as a closed cosmos or as a subsisting world of nature. This Hebrew thought is contained in those important passages of the Old Testament which are impregnated with a pathos for the new (das Novum), for the new time and for the new coming world, i.e., for the new as that which never was. Greek thought, in contrast to Hebrew thought,⁶ considers that which has never been as intrinsically impossible, since for the Greeks there is \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"nothing new under the sun.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" Everything which will come in the future is only a variation of the past and an actualization or confirmation of the anamnesis. History is therefore only the indifferent return of the same within the closed realm of the eternal cosmos. Since the essence of history is here considered as cyclic, history is seen as devouring her own children over and over again, so that there is nothing new in history, and the essence of history reveals itself as nihilistic. We emphasize this contrast between the Hebrew and Greek understanding of the world in order to show that the biblical viewpoint considers the world as a historical world, in so far as it is a world \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"arising toward\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" God\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s promises under the responsibility of the Israelites, who hope in these promises. This understanding is reflected in the Genesis creation narratives, which were originally narratives of God\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s promises (so that they therefore express not merely a faith in a past creation, but a faith in the new creation of God\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s promises). The revelation of God\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s name in Exodus 3, 14 also indicates that this eschatological horizon is the central aspect of God\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s revelation. The expression \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"I am who I am\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" is much better translated as \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"I will be who I will be.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" (So Gerhard von Rad and Martin Buber and a footnote in the RSV.) According to this version God revealed himself to Moses more as the power of the future than as a being dwelling beyond all history and experience. God is not \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"above us\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" but \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"before us.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" His transcendence reveals itself as our \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"absolute future.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" This future is grounded in

6. See Johannes B. Mctz, \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"Welt,\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" LThK X, pp. 1023-1026. 88

itself, and is self-possessed. It is a future that is not erected out of the potentialities of our human freedom and human action. Rather, this future calls forth our potentialities to unfold themselves in history. Only such a future—one that is more than just the projections of our abilities—can call us to realize truly new possibilities, to become that which has never existed. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"I will be who I will be.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" The future proclaimed here does not get its power from our present wishes and effort.⁷ No, its power stems from itself: it belongs to itself. Only thus can and does this future exert its stirring and liberating power over every human present, over every generation.

Secondly: the New Testament message does not remove the faith\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s orientation toward the future or hope in the future as the necessary and essential structure of faith. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"The firm belief in the nearness of the Kingdom, which Jesus proclaimed and initiated, effected such a concentration and mobilization toward the promised future, that everything of the mere past and of the mere present lost its relevance.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"⁸ It would be moreover false to think that in the Christ-Event the future is entirely behind us, as if the future of the history after Christ only plays itself out, but does not realize itself. On the contrary, the Christ-Event intensifies this orientation toward the not yet realized future. The proclamation of the resurrection of Jesus, which can never be separated from the message of the crucifixion, is essentially a proclamation of promise which initiates the Christian mission. This mission achieves its future in so far as the Christian alters and \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"innovates\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" the world toward that future of God which is definitely promised to us in the resurrection of Jesus Christ. The New Testament is therefore centered on hope—a creative expectancy—as the very essence of Christian existence.

7. Wolthart Pannenberg, \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"Der Gott der Hoffnung,\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" in Ernst Block zu Ehren, p. 215.

8. Ibid., p. 212.

Thirdly: in view of the above, the Christian has the responsibility to develop his faith\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s relationship to the world as a relationship of hope, and to explicate his theology as eschatology. Although theology has a tract on eschatology, it generally puts this eschatology in a corner well away from the center of theology in the treatise \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"on the last things.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" Eschatology lacks a vital relationship to the whole of theology and it thereby fails to be related to the theology of the world. Christian eschatology must come out of its corner, into which it was shoved by a theology which has forgotten the relevance of hope and of the future. Since Christians are simply .defined by Paul as \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"those who have hope,\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" should they not understand their theology in every aspect as eschatology, and as the responsibility of hope? Eschatology is not a discipline beside other disciplines, but that basic discipline which determines, forms, and shapes every theological statement, especially those concerning the world. The attempt to interpret theology in a totally existential or personalistic way is an important accomplishment of theology. I attempted in my Christliche Anthropozentrik to base this interpretation upon Thomas Aquinas. Ibis existential-anthropological theology,, however, easily becomes isolated from the world and history, when eschatology is not seen to be more basic to theology. Only in the eschatological horizon of hope does the world appear as history. Only in the understanding of world as history does the free action of man obtain its central position. Only this central position of human freedom initiates a legitimate Christian anthropocentrism. The universal existential-anthropological viewpoint in the Christian theology depends on the eschatological viewpoint. This is true, because only in the eschatological horizon of hope does the world appear as an arising reality, whose development or process is committed to the free action of man. In addition, Christology and Eccles;ology must also be explicated in this horizon of eschatology, so that they are not abbreviated to either mere existentialanthropological or objectivized and cosmological viewpoints. At this point we can only mention these considerations and aspects.

We will however say a word concerning ecclesiology further below.

Fourthly: it would be tempting, and important, to indicate how the process of the so-called secularization of the world was only possible because the world itself was experienced and understood in the eschatological horizon of hope. The world appears in this horizon not as a fixed and sacrosanct reality in a pre-established harmony, but as an arising reality, which can be innovated toward its future through the historically free actions of men. This universal alteration and innovation of the world through the offensive of human freedom characterizes that process, which we call secularization. We must however pass over this question here and proceed to our next thesis.

3.Third Thesis. The relationship between the Christian faith and the world should be characterized from a theological viewpoint as a creative and militant eschatology.

First: In explaining and establishing this thesis we would like to refer to a noteworthy sentence of St. Thomas Aquinas. He states in scholastic terminology that man does not have a natural last end (finis ultimus naturalis) and a supernatural last end (finis ultimus supematuralis); but he has only one last end, namely, the future promised by God. From the viewpoint of the future the often used—perhaps too often used—distinction between the natural and the supernatural recedes into the background. In our relationship to the future we cannot be satisfied with a distinction which separates the natural future of the world from the supernatural future of the faith and of the Church. Both dimensions converge in our relationship to the future. In other words, since the hope of the Christian faith is orientated toward the future, it cannot fulfill itself in bypassing the world and the future of the world. And because this hope is responsible for the one promised future, it is therefore also responsible for the future of the world. The Christian faith hopes not only in itself, the Church hopes not only in itself, but they hope in the world.

Secondly: Is the biblical hope, however, really so radically orientated toward this one and undivided future? Is the Old Testament\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s conception of hope as a hope in the world and in its future still valid? Does not the New Testament require that this hope be impregnated with and accompanied by a renunciation of the world? It would indeed be unwise and an empty compromise with the spirit of the times, if we would suppress or minimize this motif of the New Testament\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s conception of hope. I am aware of this motif and I consider it important—even for our times. However, everything hinges upon a correct understanding of what is properly meant by the renunciation of the world. Because man can never live apart from the world or worldless (that is, without a world), this renunciation could never be a mere flight out of the world. For such a flight would then be a deceptive and illusory flight into an artificially isolated- world, which de facto is often the more comfortable religious situation of yesterday. Not a flight out of the world, but a flight with the world \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"forward\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" is the fundamental dynamism of the Christian hope in its renunciation of the world. This renunciation is therefore a flight only out of that self-made world which masters its present and lives solely out of its present, and whose \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"time is always here\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" (see Jn. 7, 6). Christians should attentively listen to Saint Paul when he exhorts them to renounce the world, and when he urges them \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"not to be conformed to this world\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" (see Rom. 12, 2). Paul does not criticize here the Christian\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s solidarity with the world, but his conformity to the existing world as enraptured with its own appearance, and as concerned only with its self-glorification. Paul criticizes this world insofar as it tries to determine its own future and to degrade this future to a function of the powerful and power-hungry present. The Apostle does not demand a one-sided (undialektisch) denial of the world or a total refusal of engagement with the world. But rather he urges the Christians to be prepared for a painful estrangement from the present world situation. He exhorts them to renounce the foregone conclusions of their times (see also Mt. 12, 29ff.) and to abstain from the proud boastfulness and vanity of the world (see 1 Cor. 1, 29). All of this, however, is done for the sake of that future promised by God. The Christian is moved to flee and to renounce the world not because he despises the world but because he hopes in the future of the world as proclaimed in God\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s promises. And this hope gives him a responsibility for the world and its future—a future from which we can too often isolate ourselves in forms of presumption and despair. This Christian renunciation of the world has its origin in the spirit of biblical hope and it serves the hope of all. It is the imitation of Christ at the hour of his crucifixion. This hour represents the singular affirmation of the world and the overcoming of the world. The Christian renunciation of the world takes on the servant\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s form of a crucified hope for the world. A faith which is guided by such a hope is primarily not a doctrine, but an initiative for the passionate innovating and changing of the world toward the Kingdom of God.

Thirdly: In this perspective we can more adequately define the relationship between Church and world. Despite the many discussions about the Church and the world there is nothing more unclear than the nature of their relationship to one another. The usual contemporary statements about the turning of the Church toward the world and about the positive evaluation of the world by the Church, etc., often add to the confusion and unclarity. Is the Church actually something other than the world? Is not the Church also world? Are not Christians—i.e., the Church—also of the world? Where is the Church turning to in her movement toward the world? The Church is of the world: In a certain sense the Church is the world: The Church is not Non-World (Die Kirche ist nicht Nicht-Welt). For it is that world which attempts to live from the promised future of God, and to call that world in question which understands itself only in terms of itself and its possibilities. The decisive relationship between the Church and the world is not spatial but temporal. The Church is the eschatological community and the exodus community. Its institutional and sacramental life is based on this eschatological character. The Eucharist is the sacrament of the Exodus; it is the commemoration of the death of Christ as promise—donee dominus venial. The Church is not the goal of her own strivings; this goal is the Kingdom of God. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"The Church always lives in a certain sense from the proclamation of her provisional character and from her historically progressive surrender to the coming Kingdom of God.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"⁹ The Church has a hope and witnesses to a hope, but its hope is not in itself. It is rather a hope in the Kingdom of God as the future of the world. Ecclesia est universale sacramentum spei pro totius mundi salute.

Fourthly: How does the Church reali2e its mission to work for the future of the world? It cannot be by pure contemplation, since contemplation by definition relates to what has already become existent and to what actually exists. The future which the Church hopes for is not yet here, but is emerging and arising (entstehend). Therefore the hope which the Church sets in itself and in the world should be creative and militant. In other words, Christian hope should realize itself in a creative and militant eschatology. Our eschatological expectation does not look for the heavenly-earthly Jerusalem as that ready-made and existing, promised city of God. This heavenly city does not lie ahead of us as a distant and hidden goal, which only needs to be revealed. The eschatological City of God is now coming into existence, for our hopeful approach builds this city. We are workers building this future, and not just interpreters of this future. The power of God\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s promises for the future moves us to form this world into the eschatological city of God. The council in the Constitution on the Church says, \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"Renovatio mundi . . . in hoc saeculo reali quodam modo anticipatur.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" The Christian is a \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"co-worker\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" in bringing the promised universal era of peace and justice. The orthodoxy of a Christian\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s faith must constantly make itself true in the \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"orthopraxy\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" of his actions orientated toward the final future, because the promised truth is a truth which must be made (seeJn. 3, 2 Iff.).

9. Karl Rahner, \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"Kirche und Parusie Christi,\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" Schriften zur Thfologie, Einsiedein, 1965, p. 351.

The Christian eschatology therefore is not—despite its popularity among the existential theologians—a mere presential or actual eschatology, in which the passion for the future exhausts itself in a mere \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"making present\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" of eternity in the actual moment of personal decision. Nor is Christian eschatology a mere passive waiting, in which the world and its time-span appear as • a waiting room, where the Christian lounges around in lackadaisical boredom until God opens the door of his office and allows the Christian to enter. Christian eschatology is, however, a productive and militant eschatology, which gradually realizes itself. Since Christian hope (is that very hope which) does not only eat its stew but must also brew its stew. An eschatological faith and an engagement in the world do not exclude one another. Because Paul\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s words \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"do not conform to the world\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" do not only mean that we should change ourselves, \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"but also that we should in conflict and creative expectation change the pattern of this world in which we believe, hope and love. The hope of the Gospel has a polemical and a liberating relation to man\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s present and practical life and to the (social) conditions in which man leads his life.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"¹⁰

10. Jurgen Moltmann, Theologie der Hoffnung, Munich, 1964, p. 304.

Fifthly: A theology of the world which is guided by this creative-militant eschatology cannot unfold itself in the style and categories of the old theological cosmology. Moreover, it cannot discharge its task with the categories of a mere transcendental, personal and existential theology because they are too individualistic and isolated. Since the theology of the world is not a mere theology of the cosmos nor a mere transcendental theology of the human person and existence, but a theology of the emerging political and social order, this theology of the world must be a political theology. An eschatologically oriented theology must place itself in communication with the prevailing political, social and technical Utopias and with the contemporary maturing promises of a universal peace and justice. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"The Christian salvation for which we hope is not only a personal salvation of one\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s soul or a mere rescuing of the individual from the evil world. Nor is it just a consolation for the personal conscience in temptation. It is also the achieving of an eschatological order of justice, the humanizing of man and the establishing of a universal peace. This \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"aspect\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" of our reconcilation with God has not been given sufficient prominence in the history of Christianity because Christians have no longer seen themselves in their true eschatological horizon, but have left the terrescrial-eschatological expectations to the fanatics and enthusiasts.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"¹¹ In obeying its eschatological vocation Christianity should not establish itself as a ghetto-society or become the ideological protective shell for the existing society. Rather it should become the liberating and critical force of this one society. Christianity should not establish itself as a \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"microsociety\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" beside the \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"great secular society.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" Any separation of Church and State leading to a ghetto or to a micro-society is fatal. The terminus a quo of the Christian mission should be the secular society. On this society must the \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"osmotic pressure\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" of the Christian hope be exerted. The various institutions of Christianity find their legitimation and also their criterion in their eschatological mission. Wherever these institutions serve Christianity\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s self-protection more than its venture forward (nach vorn), then the bastions of these institutions should be dismantled.

And finally: the Christian\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s militant hope is not simply a II. Ibid., p. 303.

\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"militant optimism.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" Nor does it canonize man\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s own progress. His hope is rather a hope against every hope which we place in the man-made idols of our secular society. The Christian hope is not a cunning trick of man\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s reason in order to unravel the mysteries (Entmysterialisierung) of the future. Christian eschatology is not an omniscient ideology about the future, but a theologia negatwa of the future. This poverty of knowledge is rather the very wealth of Christianity. What distinguishes the Christian and the secular ideologies of the future from one another is not that the Christians know more, but that they know less about the sought-after future of humanity and that they face up to this poverty of knowledge: \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"By faith Abraham obeyed when he was called to go out to a place which he was to receive as an inheritance; and he went out not knowing where he was to go\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" (see Heb. 11, 8). Moreover, the Christian hope is aware of its own fatal perils; in short, it is aware of death. For in the face of death all shining promises fade away. This Christian hope is the anticipatory (proleptic) practice in dying. And even this aspect of hope should not be limited to an individualistic and worldless attitude. Christian hope is essentially directed to the world of our brother, since this hope fulfills itself in love for the other, for the least of our brothers. Only in this kenosis of love is death overcome. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"We know that we have passed out of death into life, because we love the brethren\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" (see 1 Jn. 3, 14). The Christian hope enters into the passion of death in this kenosis of love to the least of our brothers. This is the imitation of Jesus:

He did not live for himself, but for us. Hope is this living for \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"the other.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"

APPENDIX II

On the Hiddenness of the Problem of the Future in Metaphysics

The decline of eschatology in theology goes hand in hand with the hiddenness of the future in that philosophy which has acquired a major influence on the conceptual development of theology: the metaphysics of being, whether objectivistically developed (as in scholasticism) or—since Kant—as transcendental or personal or existential metaphysics. This assertion may be surprising in the face of the emphatic talk about historicalness in recent transcendental, personal, and existential philosophy. But this talk of history and historicalness involves a tacit, unquestioned assumption, namely, that history is the history of the origin of the particular present. Because of this tacit identification of history with the history of origin, of history with history that has taken place, the rank and the primacy of the future remain hidden. The future appears exclusively as the correlate of the present, but not as a reality grounded in itself and belonging to itself, which precisely does not have the character of what exists and is present and therefore cannot be—in the classical sense— ontologized. The purely metaphysical and ontological treatment of the problem of historicalness conceals within the problem the place of the future.

This does not happen by chance, but is in the nature of the thing, for the purely contemplative and conceptual nature of metaphysics cannot take up an appropriate attitude to the future. In it another perspective of time operates, namely, the \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"always\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" cal pre-eminence of origin and presence. The problem of the what is not yet, what has never been, of what is really \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"new,\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" through which alone freedom can understand itself as freedom, remains obscured. Anamnesis, remembering, dominates.

The same thing seems to me—omnibus perpensis—to be true of Hegel\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s impressive metaphysics of history. Its occasion seems to have been the effect the French Revolution had on him¹ and hence the experience of the \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"new,\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" of what had never existed before, in history and as history. But in the course of his thinking Hegel shades off this experience into a comprehensive metaphysics of history, into a contemplative interpretation of history as a whole, through which he again observes the problem of the future, of that which cannot be made the object of possible contemplation.² Hegel (like perhaps all metaphysicians) knows too much of history in a purely contemplative, conceptual way for him to establish an appropriate relationship to the nature of history, to the future, which is not made manifest contemplatively but in action.

Thus, in his theses against Feuerbach, Marx makes a programmatic statement against this view. Although its apophthegmatic form makes it ambiguous, the \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"conscience of the future\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" can be heard in it. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"The philosophers have only given different interpretations of the world, but the important thing is to transform it.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" This proposition should not simply be canonized, but modified. Theory (and hence philosophy) is by no means to be totally excluded. But this theory must be much more firmly related to action than the ways of philosophizing familiar to us from theology admit.

1. See J. Ritter, Hegel und die framosische Revolution, Frankfurt, 1965.

2. See especially E. Bloch, Subjekt-Objekt, Frankfurt, 1962; also J. Habermas, \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"Hegels Kritik der franzosischen Revolution,\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\" in TheoriePraxis, Neuwied, 1963, pp. 89-107; H. Arendt,Uber die Revolution,Frankfurt,1965, pp. 63ff.

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